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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
EXTENDED TO THE
CORPORATE OMBUDSMANEMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP VIA
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

501
Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.'

I. INTRODUCTION
While there is no universally accepted definition of a corporate ombudsman,
many companies view a corporate ombudsman as a neutral manager within a
corporation, who may provide informal assistance to both managers and employees
in resolving work-related concerns and whose office is located outside of the
management structure. 2 Serious interest in utilizing a corporate ombudsman did
not take a firm hold in the corporate arena until the 1900's.3 Reasons for
increased interest in the corporate ombudsman include: an increasingly welleducated employee pool, changing laws and statutes, and stresses associated with
huge increases in government contracting.4 Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
introduces a new concept into the corporate structure-the ombudsman-employee
privilege. 5 In Kientzy, a corporate ombudsman encountered the evidentiary law
principle of privileged communication and established another privilege, the
ombudsman-employee privilege, which is supported by Federal Rule of Evidence
501.6

1. 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991). The court ruled on the issue pertaining to this Note on
January 31, 1991 by ruling on a pre-trial motion. At the time of this writing the jury has rendered a
verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $200,000 compensatory damages and $400,000 punitive
damages. However, subsequent to this motion the court reversed the award for punitive damages based
on an error in the jury instructions. The trial judge has yet to decide the issue of attorney fees but has
awarded $75,000 in front pay. Telephone interview with Jerome Dobson, attorney for plaintiff Kientzy
(Sept. 25, 1991).
2. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 127, 127
(1987).
3. Id. at 139.
4. Id.
5. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. 570.
6. Id. at 571.
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II. THE CASE

The dispute arose when plaintiff, Mary Kientzy, brought an action against the
defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC). 7 The plaintiff, a security
officer with MDC, alleged that MDC fired her on account of her gender, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Missouri Human
Rights Act of' 1986. This proceeding was initiated upon the motion of Theresa
Clemente, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), 9 in an attempt to
protect the communications Clemente received as a result of her position as a
The principal purpose of the MDC
corporate ombudsman for MDC.' 0
corporate ombudsman program "is to mediate, in a strictly confidential environment, disputes between MDC employees and between employees and management." 1
Following the decision of a company disciplinary committee, MDC fired the
plaintiff in August, 1988.12 After the committee's decision, the plaintiff went to
Clemente but was nevertheless fired by MDC. 13 The plaintiff gave notice for
hoped to depose other company personnel about their
deposition to Clemente and
14
statements to Clemenle.
Both Clemente and MDC contended that confidential communications made
to Clemente were protected from disclosure by Federal Rule of Evidence 501."5
Kientzy asserted that the information sought by her did not fall within any
ombudsman privilege claimed by Clemente and MDC."6 The plaintiff argued that
the information Clemente received was relevant to the pending trial and was
discoverable on several grounds. First, the plaintiff contends that statements made

7. Id
8. Id. For purposes of this Note it is not necessary to understand the basis or validity of the
plaintiff's claim under either the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), or the Missouri
Human Rights Act of 1986, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 213.010-.126 (1986).
9. The relevant portion of this rule states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating
to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had ....
FED. R. Qv. P. 26(cX1).
10. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571. Clemente is employed by MDC as a Senior Staff Assistant in the
ombudsman program of MDC's subsidiary McDonnell Aircraft Company (McAir) and has been
employed in the ombudsman office since its inception in 1985. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The court, in ruling on the pre-trial motion, considered only the issue of the claimed
communications privilege and did not review any substantive claims as to the findings made by the
disciplinary committee resulting in the plaintiff's termination. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. d
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to Clemente by MDC personnel may show a discriminatory purpose in firing
her.1 7 Further, the plaintiff claimed that the ombudsman program was a company
procedure for appealing her dismissal and that Clemente participated in the final
decision to fire her."' The plaintiff finally argued that Clemente received details
concerning plaintiff's situation from company employees, including a member of
the disciplinary committee who had since died. 9
In ruling on this motion, the federal district court held that Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 recognizes a common law privilege extending to a corporate
ombudsman.20 In particular, a party may not ask witnesses to disclose their
statements made to the company ombudsman. 21 Also, absent a showing that
Clemente had non-confidential, relevant information about the details leading to
the plaintiff's discharge, Kientzy may not depose Clemente at all.2
III. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the Kientzy holding one must have a proper understanding of the role of an ombudsman, particularly in the corporate setting. In
addition, to recognize the importance of Kientzy, it is necessary to understand the
application of privileged communication as interpreted by federal courts.
A. Development and Functions of the Ombudsman
In a general sense, an ombudsman is a person commissioned to protect
others, particularly against possible impropriety on the part of the bureaucracy.23
Often the ombudsman is defined as an independent and non-partisan officer of the
government, usually provided for in the state constitution to supervise the
administration.' Primarily, the ombudsman deals with specific complaints from
the citizenry against administrative abuses and maladministration. 2
The
ombudsman has the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but not to reverse

17. Id.

18. Id. The case law and published articles studied by this author on the purpose of the corporate
ombudsman do not support the claim by the plaintiff that the ombudsman program isan appellate
procedure within the company.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 573.
22. Id.
23. Lundvik, A Brief Survey of the History of the Ombudsman, 2 THE OMBUDSMAN J. 85, 85
(1982).
24. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845,
845-47 (1975) (citing D. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN: CmrrzEN's DEFENDER xxiv (1968)). This

definition is taken from the Scandinavian model. The explanation given contains the three essential
features of the classical definition. ld.
25. Id.
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administrative actions.26 However, ombudsmandery is not confined to the
dealings of the government and its citizens. In North America, about 100 colleges
and universities employ the use of ombudsmen.27 Another 200 corporations
possess ombudsmen offices.' Three dozen newspapers have an ombudsman, an
estimated 4,000 hospitals have patient ombudsmen offices and an even larger
number of small businesses have a similar type of client or consumer complaint
office."
An area which is experiencing tremendous growth in providing
ombudsmandery services is the health profession.3
All of the above mentioned professions utilize the efforts of the ombudsman
in relatively similar ways. The various activities of an ombudsman may include
"performance appraisals; job security and retirement issues; company policies;
discipline/termination; discrimination and harassment; safety, ethics and whistleblowing; transfers; personality conflicts/meanness; information referral; suggestions; working conditions; personal health, neentoring, 31and counseling issues;
management practices; bizarre behavior and problems."
The function and purpose of the corporate ombudsman varies little from that
of the traditional ombudsmen in areas mentioned above. The public perception
of corporations along with the absence of checks and balances within the corporate
structure justifies and defines the present role of a corporate ombudsman. 2 The
corporate ombudsman is typically a senior official who receives complaints, made
on a confidential basis.3 3 These complaints consist of purportedly improper
conduct from the public, employees, or others.' Further, an ombudsman acts as
a neutral fact finder who provides an outlet to employees bothered by whether a
corporation's conduct is ethical or legal.35 An important feature of the corporate
ombudsman is that an employee can vent his or her frustrations without fear of

26. Id.

27. Rowe, supra note 2, at 139.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Waxman, A Nonlitigational Approach to Conflict Resolution: The Medical Center as a
Model, ARBrrRATON J., March 1987, at 25. This article provides an excellent overview of the
complexities of a medical center calling for the special services of an ombudsman.
The organizational and interpersonal structure of the medical center, together with the
increasing complexity of health care, education, and research; the growth of health-care
institutions; and the increasing competition for resources within the health-care
community, have enhanced the potential for conflict and controversy [within the medical
center] and have made them more complex.
Id. at 25. Use of an ombudsman provides a reliable means for the identification of general problems
and promotes the discussion and resolution of forthcoming problems before they develop into full
blown disputes. Id. The ombudsman system provides the medical center with an informal structure
and encourages consultation at a relatively early stage in the development of disputes. Id. at 34.
31. Rowe, supra note 2, at 135.
32. Futter, An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations: A Corporate Ombudsperson?,
46 Bus. LAW. 29, 35 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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termination or other punishment.3 The employee finds security in the knowledge
that reporting the problem to the ombudsman will not be divulged or later used
against the employee. 7 In order to uncover facts and make recommendations to
the management, the corporate ombudsman is also responsible for investigating
complaints and talking to company personnel.m
As mentioned previously, the concept of a corporate ombudsman grew out
of negative public perception of the corporate entity.3 9 Having an ombudsman
detached from the political control of management leads to increased corporate
integrity and elevates its overall image.4° Also, delegating these duties to the
corporate ombudsman frees top management to concentrate on activities necessary
for the profitable growth of the corporation. 41 The value of the ombudsman is
reflected in the flexibility it can provide in mediation at all levels of the corporate
ladder.42
B. PrivilegedCommunication
Evidentiary privileges trace back to the first privilege of protecting the
attorney-client relationship.43 Cases supporting this privilege appear as early as
1577. 44 By the early 1800's, courts in England began to develop common law
The determination of when
principles concerning evidentiary privileges.4'
privileges apply in the federal courts remained unsettled until the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 46 Federal courts applying rules of privileged
communication look to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

ld
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.

Futter, supra note 32, at 55.
Id. at 55-56.
Waxman, supra note 30, at 34.
Comment, Privikged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1456 (1985).
ld
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1463.
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States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law. 7
Courts interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 501 often recognize the more
popular privileges such as attorney-client, clergy-parishioner, and husband-wife
privileges, but refrain from applying modern privileges found in statutes or state
case law.4 The Court in Trammel v. United States49 held that Congress
"manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege;" but rather,
its purpose is to provide the courts with the ability to develop rules of privileged
communication depending on the facts of each case."e Further, the Trammel
court held that in federal criminal trials, the federal courts have authority to
"continue evolutionary development" of testimonial privileges in the light of
reason and experience.5 ' In refusing to recognize a spousal privilege, the
Trammel court balanced the interests in a spousal privilege
against the need for
2
probative evidence in the regulation of criminal justice,
The federal courts recognize four necessary conditions for establishing a
privilege against the disclosure of communications. 3 In In re Doe,s the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit listed these conditions as: (1) the communication must be made with the belief that it will not be divulged; (2) confidentiality
must be necessary to the preservation of the relationship between the two parties;
(3) the relationship should be recognized by society as one worthy of being
promoted; and (4) a balancing approach in which the injury to the relationship
incurred by disclosure must outweigh the benefit gained in the correct disposal of
litigation. 5 The party claiming the privileged communication bears the burden

47. FED. R. EviD. 501.
48. Comment, supra note 43, at 1470.
49. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). In Trammel, petitioner Otis Trammel was indicted for importing heroin
into the United States. The indictment also charged petitioner with conspiracy to import heroin and
named petitioner's wife as a co-conspirator although she was never indicted. Prior to trial on the
charges in the indictment, petitioner, fearing the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse
witness, asserted his claim to a privilege to prevent her from testifying against him. Id. at 42.
50. Id. at 47.
51. Id. There is no indication in the Trammel holding that the court meant to imply that only
criminal trials could support a continuous evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.
52. Id. at 51. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals which held that privileged
communication does not exist to prohibit voluntary testimony of a spouse against a spouse when the
testifying spouse is doing so as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity in return for her
testimony. Id. at 43, 53.
53. In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187,1193 (2d Cir. 1983); Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co., 178 F. Supp. 653,
654 (D. Minn. 1959).
54. 711 F.2d 1187.
55. Id. at 1193.
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of establishing the necessary elements of the privileged relationship.
In the 1987 decision of Shabazz v. Scurr,57 an Iowa district court became
the first court to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in the context of an
ombudsman relationship. The court's concern centered upon the power of a
former prison ombudsman to act as a private investigator in a federal constitutional
case which arose during the time he was employed as a prison ombudsman."
The Shabazz court held that communications received by the prison ombudsman
were privileged matters which could not be repeated in court.59 In recognizing
a limited privilege in the ombudsman context, the court held that Congress left the
job of crafting the breadth of evidentiary privileges in federal subject matter cases
to the federal courts, requiring only that they be controlled by the principles of
common law as interpreted in light of "reason and experience. " 60 The court
further reasoned that in recognizing this limited privilege it did not prevent the
party challenging the privilege from using other means to discover the relevant
information.6' The privilege only barred disclosure of communications; it did not
prevent discovery of underlying facts by those who communicated with the
ombudsman. 62
Less than one year before the Kientzy ruling, the court in Monoranjan Roy
v. United Technologies Corp.63 recognized, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
501, privileged communication between a corporate ombudsman and an
employee." The court made a special effort to state that its findings were based
on the particular circumstances presented before it.' The Monoranjan court
relied principally upon Shabazz in extending the concept of privileged communication for an ombudsman in a prison context to the corporate setting." The
Kientzy decision then expanded Monoranjan by establishing a communications
privilege between a corporate ombudsman and an employee.67

56. In re Grand Jury Subpoena DTD. January 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1984).
57. 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id. at 93. In particular, the court held that the former ombudsman "must refrain from revealing
privileged matters, either as an investigator or witness." Id. Further, the court ordered that if the former
ombudsman is to be called at trial he is to be deposed as soon as possible and all questions as to
privileged information should be asked at that time with all objections based on that privilege, being
made at that time. Id.
60. Id. at 91.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id.

63. No. H-89-680 (D. Conn. May 29, 1990). This case was settled prior to trial. The resolution
of the issue we are concerned with was settled by a pre-trial motion granting the protective order. Id.
at 27.
64. Id. at 23-24.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 23-24.
67. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571.
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IV. THE KIENzy CASE
The Kientzy court began its analysis by stating that the court is required to
interpret the question of whether to recognize a privilege by looking to the
common law "in light of reason and experience." 68 In looking to reason and
experience, the court analyzed the four factors found in In re Doe, and applied
them to the facts before the courto.
The first factor, belief in the confidentiality of the communication, was
satisfied by ombudsman Clemente's receipt of communications in the belief that
they would remain confidential. 70 For further support of this finding, the court
pointed to Clemente's membership in the Corporate Ombudsman Association
which bound her through a code of ethics to keep communications confidential. 1
The court also noted the defendant's adoption of procedures assuring confidentiali72
ty and its strict pledge of confidentiality given to all of its employees.
The court found that the second factor recognized by the Doe court,
confidentiality being necessary to the preservation of the relationship between the
parties, to be satisfied.7 3 The function of the ombudsman's office in this case
was to receive communications and to remedy work related problems in a strictly
confidential atmosphere.74 Absent this confidentiality, the ombudsman's office
would be just another non-confidential opportunity for an employee to communi7
cate her complaints. "
The Kientzy court also found the third factor, societal interest in the
relationship between the parties, present in this case. 76 Defendant, a large
government contractor in the aerospace and defense industries, and its employees
needed to make confidential statements and to receive confidential guidance and
aid to benefit themselves and possibly the nation. 7 The court made a special
effort to state that this need of the employees existed in spite of some employees'
perception that such actions may be against company or other employee
interests.78
The court finally examined the fourth factor recognized by In re Doe, that

68. Id.
69. Id. at 571-73.
70. Id. at 571-72.
71. Id. at 572.
72. Id. The court did not state what "procedures" to assure confidentiality were employed.
However, to satisfy the first factor it is only necessary that the one claiming the privilege demonstrate
that the communicating employee believed that the "procedures" assured confidentiality. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. ld. An issue that immediately becomes evident is determining whether there exists a sufficient
societal interest when the corporation employing the ombudsman is involved in a less important activity
that does not bear directly on national security. This issue will be discussed later in this Note.
78. Id.
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the injury to the relationship incurred by disclosure must outweigh the advantage
in avoiding litigation.7 The court stated that a successful ombudsman program
resolves disputes quicker than other more litigious methods. 8° Requiring
Clemente to testify concerning her communications would destroy the reputation
of confidentiality now enjoyed by the ombudsman program and essentially
eliminate its effectiveness!' Therefore, the fourth factor of In re Doe was
satisfied. 82
The Kientzy court concluded that the purpose of the program, to resolve
disputes quickly and eliminate the need for more formal methods, was based upon
the confidentiality of the communications between the ombudsman and employees
and between the ombudsman and company officials.' Finding all four factors
met, the court determined that the communications made with ombudsman
Clemente were privileged, and hence, were inadmissible at trial.8
The court cited Shabazz and Monoranjan as cases recognizing similar
privileges concerning communications made to an ombudsman.' The Kientzy
court acknowledged that Monoranjan implemented the United States Supreme
Court's intention that the development of the rules of privilege should be done on
a case-by-case basis.'
The court's final justification for granting Clemente's motion for a protective
order was that the plaintiff's need for relevant information could be satisfied
regardless of the privilege." Plaintiff could simply take the deposition of
witnesses, including those members of the disciplinary committees, regarding the
events leading to the plaintiff's dismissal.U The court held that the plaintiff may
ask witnesses about facts known to them, even though these facts were included
in the statements made to the ombudsman." Because the Kientzy court recognized a privilege extending to the communications made to the ombudsman, the
plaintiff may not ask witnesses to disclose information conveyed to the ombudsman and the plaintiff may not depose the ombudsman concerning any matter.'

79. Id.
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 572.
Id
Id. at 573.

88. Id Similar reasoning was used in the Shabazz and Monoranjan holdings. What effect other
possible means of acquiring the necessary relevant information has on the court's holding is unclear
and will be discussed later in this Note.
89. Id.

90. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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V. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT

Kientzy provides the starting point of what seems to be the development of
a blanket privilege extending to communication between corporate ombudsmen
and employees. However, several critical questions remain unanswered by
Kientzy. In particular, the Kientzy court made a special effort to justify the
privilege based upon the defendant's status as a very large government contractor.91 This fact, according to Kientzy, is sufficient to satisfy the third necessary
element in recognizing a privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501-a
relationship which society considers worthy of being fostered. 2 In its one
paragraph analysis of the societal interest, the court speaks almost exclusively in
terms of the defendant's position in protecting national security.9 3 The court
notes the importance of the employees having an opportunity to make confidential
communications and receive "aid to remedy workplace problems to benefit
themselves and possibly the nation." 9' From the Kientzy holding it is not clear
whether a corporation without the obvious impact on national security would meet
the criteria of providing a relationship between ombudsman and employee which
society is willing to promote.
What is the result if a corporate ombudsman privilege is claimed and the
corporation in which the ombudsman is employed manufactures trinkets or other
seemingly unimportant products? This question was left unresolved by the Kientzy
court. The confusion created by Kientzy is not removed by simply looking to
Monoranjan.95 Monoranjan also recognized an ombudsman privilege in the
corporate setting; however, the ombudsman, as in Kientzy, was employed by a
defense contractor.'
The court in Monoranjan also made it clear that "its
findings and rulings on this motion are based on the particular circumstances
presented here." 97 The Kientzy court gave no such similar limiting language.
Certainly, corporations with similar national interests will have an easier time
asserting the claim of privileged communication between its ombudsman and the
corporation's employees. The Kientzy holding is too fresh and the analysis used
in finding a societal interest worthy of being fostered is too murky to predict with
any accuracy the extent to which this newly created ombudsman privilege will be
applied. Obviously, the criteria of a relationship being one that society wishes to
foster is fair game for crafty lawyering.
The extent of application of this newly created privilege depends in part on

91. Id. at 572.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95.
Kientzy
96.
97.

This case, discussed earlier in the text, recognized a similar privilege less than a year before
was decided. Monoranjan, No. H-89-680, slip op. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
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whether the privilege takes the form of a rule or a standard.98 Traditionally,
judges and commentators insist that privileges should take the form of rules, thus
assuring certainty and predictability in their application." However, certainty
and predictability are not the only justifications for privileges being applied as
hard and fast rules. Political biases leading judges to intentionally rule against a
particular litigant are controlled by applying a rule instead of a case-by-case
balancing approach. 100 Additionally, rules can reduce time spent and administrative costs necessary in resolving arguable evidentiary matters.01 Yet, while
aiding in predictability, rules tend to be overinclusive or underinclusive, protecting
some relationships they should not while not protecting others that they
should. 02 The Kientzy court failed to cite the precedent for its establishment of
a privileged communication between a corporate ombudsman and the corporation's
employees. However, the Kientzy court did cite to Monoranjan which based its
that the rules of privilege should be
decision on the Supreme Court's position
1 3
developed on a case-by-case basis. 1
Whether the communications privilege developed in Kientzy is viewed as a
rule or standard, post-Kientzy decisions will continue to wrestle with whether the
policy concerns for protecting the confidentiality of communication between an
ombudsman and an employee outweigh the need for relevant evidence. Unlike
other rules which exclude evidence, the rules of privilege "are not designed or
intended to facilitate the fact finding process or to safeguard its integrity.""
The net effect of privileged communications is "clearly inhibitive; rather than
facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light."105
However, one must focus on the reality of what makes an alternative dispute
resolution concept such as the corporate ombudsman effective. Frankness is
The quick and effective
fundamental to alternative dispute resolution.' 0
would be stifled if the
concept
the
ombudsman
settlement processes offered by
be
used in eventual legal
statements made by the ombudsman or employee could
1°
"protect[s] the
communications
of
confidential
Nondisclosure
0
proceedings.
"
s
community
assent
of
the
with
an
communicant,
reliance interest of the
Reliance is necessary to promote certain communications which are needed for the
of particular relationships deemed desirable based upon societal
preservation
o
interests.'

98. Comment, supra note 43, at 1486.
99. Id. at 1487.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1488.
103. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572.
104. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

§ 72

(E. Cleargy 3d ed. 1984).

ld.
Ritter, ADR: What About Confidentiality?, 51 TEXAS BAR J. 26, 27 (1988).
Id.
State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 57 Del. 40, 53, 193 A.2d 799, 807 (Super. Ct. 1963).
Id.
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Exclusionary rules such as the one put forth by the Kientzy court go against
the fundamental principle that "the public . . . has a right to every man's
evidence." ° Despite the obvious need to uncover the truth and present relevant
evidence in the search of truth, the Federal Rules of Evidence favor limiting the
accessibility to evidence in order to encourage settlement of disputes prior to trial.
This is illustrated by Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which excludes evidence of
offers to compromise relating to the settlement of a claim. 1 ' The advisory
committee note to Rule 408 states as a ground for exclusion the "promotion of the
public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes." 2 Similarly,
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 excludes evidence of any plea of guilty which was
based upon policy favoring the
later withdrawn or a plea of nolo contendere
113
disposition of criminal cases by compromise.
Finally, the Kientzy court mentioned that absent a showing that Clemente had
non-confidential relevant information about plaintiff's termination, Clemente
cannot be deposed at all. 1 4 Had there been a showing that Clemente possessed
non-confidential, relevant information, it is unclear how the court would have
ruled. Possibly the court would follow the direction of Shabazz and would allow
Clemente to be deposed, but at the same time imposing a good-faith requirement
on Clemente not to reveal privileged material.11 5 The court may also require
11 6
Clemente to explain to the court why such information would be privileged.
Also, the courts in Shabazz, Monoranjan, and Kientzy all mention that the one
denied the privileged communication could acquire the relevant information from
other sources.1 1 7 Would the courts recognize a privilege if the one contesting
the claimed privilege made a sufficient showing that no other source existed to
acquire the relevant information? Neither of the three courts indicated an answer
to this highly probable possibility. A future court could impose a burden on the
one claiming the privilege to establish the existence of other sources of information available to the opposing side. Or the court could impose the burden on the
party denying the privilege to show that no other source exists to satisfy its need

110. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
111. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note. That rule states in relevant part:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount ....
FED. R. EVID. 408.
112. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
113. FED. R. EvmD. 410. This rule states in relevant part "Except as otherwise provided in this rule,
evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant
who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: (1) a plea of guilty which was later
withdrawn; (2) a plea of nolo contendere ... .' Id.
114. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 573.
115. See Shabazz, 662 F. Supp. at 93; see supra note 56.
116. Id.
117. Shabazz, 662 F. Supp. at 93; Monoranjan, No. H-89-680, slip op. at 27; Kientzy, 133 F.R.D.
at 573.
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for relevant information. Either result adds guidance to future litigants, guidance
which the Kientzy court refused to give.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the very least, the Kientzy court established an exclusion from judicial
proceedings for those privileged communications taking place between a corporate
ombudsman and employees when the corporation involved is vital to national
security. Subsequent courts interpreting both the Monoranjan and Kientzy
holdings will apply the ombudsman-employee privilege to situations involving
corporations not necessarily involved in maintaining national security. The
ombudsman-employee relationship rests squarely on the employee's belief that
information divulged to the ombudsman will remain confidential. Destroying the
employee's confidence in that confidentiality will likely result in destroying the
ombudsman program itself. This is true whether the ombudsman is employed by
a company that is vital to national security or employed by a company that is

obviously unrelated to national security. The purposes for employing a corporate
ombudsman, handling employee grievances, resolving personality conflicts,
providing assistance and counseling, are necessary for all corporations with a large
employee pool.
Clearly, the Supreme Court intended that the area of privileged communication continue to develop on a case-by-case basis.' The question that remains
is whether society is willing to recognize the ombudsman-employee relationship
as worthy of being maintained in all situations involving corporations or only
those involving companies vital to national security. Assuming large corporations
continue to make legitimate attempts to alleviate employee problems by using an
ombudsman program, and further assuming that the end result of employing an
ombudsman in the corporate setting continues to benefit both employer and
employee, the importance of this relationship will likewise continue the use of a
communication privilege. Perhaps the Kientzy holding came at the right time, for
the beneficial results of employing a corporate ombudsman are readily apparent
in today's corporate setting. The effectiveness of the ombudsman program, in
addition to the importance of the relationship between the ombudsman and
employee, due to the company's role in national security, justifies the court's
ruling that the communication deserves to be privileged.
KEVIN L. WIBBENMEYER

118. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

13

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1991, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 6

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss2/6

14

